Hospital managers’ perspectives with implementing quality improvement measures and a new regulatory framework: a qualitative case study by Øyri, Sina Furnes et al.
1Øyri SF, et al. BMJ Open 2020;10:e042847. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-042847
Open access 
Hospital managers’ perspectives with 
implementing quality improvement 
measures and a new regulatory 
framework: a qualitative case study
Sina Furnes Øyri   ,1 Geir Sverre Braut   ,2,3,4 Carl Macrae,1,5 Siri Wiig1
To cite: Øyri SF, Braut GS, 
Macrae C, et al.  Hospital 
managers’ perspectives 
with implementing quality 
improvement measures 
and a new regulatory 
framework: a qualitative 
case study. BMJ Open 
2020;10:e042847. doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2020-042847
 ► Prepublication history and 
additional material for this paper 
is available online. To view these 
files, please visit the journal 
online (http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 
1136/ bmjopen- 2020- 042847).
Received 17 July 2020
Revised 12 November 2020
Accepted 18 November 2020
For numbered affiliations see 
end of article.
Correspondence to
Sina Furnes Øyri;  
 sina. f. oyri@ uis. no
Original research
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2020. Re- use 
permitted under CC BY- NC. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published by 
BMJ.
ABSTRACT
A new regulatory framework to support local quality and 
safety efforts in hospitals was introduced to the Norwegian 
healthcare system in 2017. This study aimed to investigate 
hospital managers’ perspectives on implementation efforts 
and the resulting work practices, to understand if, and 
how, the new Quality Improvement Regulation influenced 
quality and safety improvement activities.
Design This article reports one study level (the 
perspectives of hospital managers), as part of a multilevel 
case study. Data were collected by interviews and 
analysed according to qualitative content analysis.
Setting Three hospitals retrieved from two regional health 
trusts in Norway.
Participants 20 hospital managers or quality advisers 
selected from different levels of hospital organisations.
Results Four themes were identified in response to the 
study aim: (1) adaptive capacity in hospital management 
and practice, (2) implementation efforts and challenges 
with quality improvement, (3) systemic changes and (4) the 
potential to learn. Recent structural and cultural changes 
to, and development of, quality improvement systems 
in hospitals were discovered (3). Participants however, 
revealed no change in their practice solely due to the new 
Quality Improvement Regulation (2). Findings indicated 
that hospital managers are legally responsible for quality 
improvement implementation and participants described 
several benefits with the new Quality Improvement 
Regulation (2). This related to adaptation and flexibility 
to local context, and clinical autonomy as an inevitable 
element in hospital practice (1). Trust and a safe work 
environment were described as key factors to achieve 
adverse event reporting and support learning processes 
(4).
Conclusions This study suggests that a lack of time, 
competence and/or motivation, impacted hospitals’ 
implementation of quality improvement efforts. Hospital 
managers’ autonomy and adaptive capacity to tailor 
quality improvement efforts were key for the new Quality 
Improvement Regulation to have any relevant impact on 
hospital practice and for it to influence quality and safety 
improvement activities.
INTRODUCTION
After years of regulatory interventions, 
management strategies and policy- making, 
improving quality and safety of healthcare 
systems remain high on political agendas 
around the world. Still, patient harm is listed 
as the world’s 14 biggest health burden along 
with illnesses such as malaria and tubercu-
losis.1–5 The process of improving quality 
and safety has traditionally involved different 
dimensions, for instance clinical effective-
ness, patient centeredness and care coordi-
nation.6 If addressed, these dimensions seek 
to achieve an optimal healthcare system6 
(see table 1 for definitions of ‘quality’ and 
‘safety’). A system perspective on quality 
improvement and involvement of stake-
holders at different levels are portrayed as key 
in efforts to improve patient outcomes, system 
performance and professional development 
(learning).7 8 Moreover, management of and 
leadership in healthcare is reckoned one of 
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The main strength of this study is the novel ap-
proach of involving hospital managers’ perspectives 
in healthcare regulation research, as they are both 
legally and practically responsible for improving 
quality and safety.
 ► Most participants had substantial clinical experi-
ence and/or still worked in the clinic environment, 
in addition to having management responsibilities. 
This provided our study with valuable insight into the 
complexity in hospital management.
 ► The study did not include all four regional health 
trusts in Norway in its data.
 ► Variations in support systems and routines for train-
ing managers differ from region to region and may 
have implicitly or explicitly impacted participants’ 
views and experiences with quality and safety 
improvement and in turn potentially influenced 
findings.
 ► The individual interviews only focused on hospital 
managers own reflections and no actual, observa-
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the fundamental elements to quality and safety, particu-
larly related to implementation of improvement activi-
ties.9 10 Inquiries into major healthcare failures, such as 
the Mid Staffordshire inquiry in 2013 and the Morecambe 
Bay inquiry in 2015 in the UK, revealed poor manage-
ment and lack of safety oversight as common contribu-
tors to quality failures.1 2 A progress report from 2018 
added to these findings, calling for stronger management 
commitment in healthcare, amplifying how quality and 
safety should be incorporated into operational culture.4 
Internationally, increased attention has been brought 
to involvement of clinicians in management roles and 
highlighted the key role top managers play in providing 
support to lower level managers.11 12 In Norway, hospital 
organisations are required to ensure their employees 
have relevant competences and training. Current leader-
ship programmes and training regularly include learning 
about quality improvement methods and systematics.5 13 14 
Yet, recent research has indicated that to make quality 
improvement a thriving part of daily management prac-
tice, it needs to be supported by a strategic commitment 
to improvement, time to spend on improvement, and a 
culture that supports managers and clinicians working 
together.15
Prior research on healthcare regulation and its relation 
to improvements in organisational behaviour, including 
conduction of external inspection, has shown inconsis-
tent outcomes in terms of its effectiveness16–21 (see table 1 
for this study’s conceptualisation of ‘regulation’ and regu-
latory activities). Several previous studies have explored 
healthcare organisations’ resilience potentials, including 
their capacity to adapt, but to date few multilevel studies 
link adaptive capacity with regulatory activities.22–31 Others 
have highlighted that actively engaged participants from 
all organisational levels in healthcare are important, 
stressing how active improvement depends on leadership, 
also in the sense of recognising conditions that require 
flexibility.7 32 The latter links management of quality 
improvement to management of adaptive capacity. Thus, 
attention should be paid to the development process of 
designing regulation that enables flexibility and supports 
adaptive capacity, by requesting non- detailed preferences 
or performance goals, especially since this may lead to a 
bottom- up perspective rather than top- bottom.16 31–35
In 2017, a new regulatory framework to support local 
quality and safety efforts was introduced in the Norwe-
gian healthcare system.13 This framework, the Regulation 
on Management and Quality Improvement in the Healthcare 
Services (referred to as the Quality Improvement Regulation) 
focuses on developing the capacity of healthcare organ-
isations to continually improve quality and safety by 
constructing non- detailed goals for risk management13 
(see table 1 for definition of ‘risk’). Although the Quality 
Improvement Regulation is considered one of the most 
important governmental tools to support local quality 
and safety efforts in hospitals,5 36 37 its impact on the 
healthcare services is still unknown from all perspectives 
(regulatory inspectors, hospital managers and healthcare 
personnel). The role of hospital managers is particularly 
important as they are stakeholders situated in the middle 
of governmental expectations and requirements, admin-
istrative demands and clinical practice.
Through the Quality Improvement Regulation, the 
regulators require hospital organisations to establish a 
system for risk management and responsibility. Its design 
embeds a structure of Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA), a four- 
step management methodology for quality improvement 
activities developed by Deming.38 The Quality Improve-
ment Regulation requires hospitals to plan for and estab-
lish systems to minimise risks, and to discover adverse 
events before they have consequences for the patients. 
Furthermore, it requires hospital managers to handle, 
correct and evaluate adverse events and failures. Accord-
ingly, this study aims to investigate hospital managers’ 
perspectives on implementation efforts and the resulting 
work practices, to understand if, and how, the new Quality 
Improvement Regulation influenced quality and safety 
improvement activities.
Contextual background of the Norwegian regulatory regime 
for quality improvement
Several governmental initiatives have been launched in 
Norway in recent years in order to facilitate the hospi-
tals’ continuous attention to patient safety and to increase 
the overall quality in the healthcare services they offer. 
The initiatives include annual quality and patient safety 
reports to the Norwegian Parliament (White Papers), 
national quality indicators, the previous National 
Table 1 Definitions and concepts
Quality We adopt the conceptualisation introduced by the Institute of Medicine defining quality through six dimensions: clinical 
effectiveness, patient safety, patient centeredness, care coordination, efficiency, timeliness and equity.6 100
Regulation We define the phenomenon of regulation generally as a governmental mechanism and specifically as the Norwegian regulatory 
framework; regime referred to in this article as the Quality Improvement Regulation with a capital ‘R’ in ‘regulation’. Different 
regulatory activities exist, with different interventionistic approaches; acts of law, internal control, self- regulation, external 
inspection; supervision.64 101
Risk We define risk as the consequence of any activity with associated uncertainty; the possibility that an event or human action 
could negatively affect valuables.102 For instance: a specific patient injury that possibly can occur during or after surgery, but with 
uncertainty to whether it will happen, when it will occur and what consequences it will lead to.103
Safety We understand safety as one dimension of quality.104 And, we apply it as the preventive measures put in place to reduce 
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Strategy for Quality Improvement in Health and Social 
Services (2005–2015), a patient safety campaign (2010–
2013), followed by a the national 5- year ‘Patient Safety 
Program’.39–41 The latter was launched in 2014, as a 
broad scale effort to reduce patient injuries.40 41 This 
programme (2014–2018) aimed at targeting several areas 
where it was believed to be crucial to increase care quality, 
including ‘Safe Surgery’ and ‘Management of Patient 
Safety’. It quantified several objectives—for instance to 
reduce infections, to improve survival rate and to improve 
patient safety culture.40 Specific improvement projects 
were developed to meet relevant challenges in specific 
hospital settings, and hospitals were expected to incorpo-
rate the different initiatives to their daily work schedules. 
The recent national action plan for quality and patient 
safety (2019–2023) maintains attention on structural and 
cultural dimensions in quality and safety improvement.5 
In addition to these initiatives, previously conducted 
external hospital supervision across health regions in 
Norway have identified several challenges to systematic 
quality improvement42–47:
 ► Lack of adequate management responsibility and 
competencies.
 ► Lack of structure to ensure coworkers have prudent 
professional qualifications.
 ► Lack of systematic collecting of and evaluation of 
risks, vulnerabilities and adverse events.
 ► Lack of implementation of planned work tasks.
 ► Lack of evaluation of improvement efforts, post 
implementation.
 ► Lack of familiarity with and implementation of the 
previous regulatory framework for quality and safety 
management ‘the Internal Control Regulations’, 
2002.48
Moreover, hospital managers’ attitudes, values and 
organisational culture for learning were associated with 
non- compliance with governmental requirements.42–46 
These challenges and issues associated with implementa-
tion of quality improvement measures in hospitals formed 
an important backdrop to the questions that were asked 
in our study.
Content and design of the quality improvement regulation
The development and enactment of the Quality Improve-
ment Regulation was thus the Government’s response 
to these challenges and launched in parallel with some 
of the other initiatives described above. The regulatory 
focus on the managerial level and the role of managers 
in risk management and quality improvement increased 
significantly with the new Quality Improvement Regula-
tion compared with the previous Internal Control Regula-
tions, as it (in a separate provision, cf. section 3) specifies 
the managerial responsibility to improve quality. The obli-
gation to delegate tasks from one management level to 
another in daily work operations was specified. Moreover, 
one new substantial provision was added (cf. § 8 litra f): 
the obligation to systematically evaluate risk management 
and quality improvement measures (yearly). The Quality 
Improvement Regulation’s purpose is hence twofold: 
by explicitly stating managerial responsibilities it aims 
at improving managerial practices, whereas the PDSA 
methodology aims at organising the services in ways that 
improve clinical care. In table 2, we illustrate details on 
the Quality Improvement Regulation’s regulatory PDSA 
design. Two specific examples of activities are given for 
each of the steps, all retrieved from the guidelines docu-
ment relating to the Quality Improvement Regulation.49
The Norwegian specialised healthcare system
Four regional health trusts across Norway are responsible 
for implementing the national policies and regulations, 
and planning, organising, governing and coordinating 
all subordinated local health trusts, including the hospi-
tals in their region (see box 1 displaying key numbers in 
the Norwegian specialist healthcare system).50 51 Every 
hospital should be organised with a responsible manager 
at all organisational levels.14 For each organisational unit 
in the hospital (eg, clinic (division or similar), depart-
ment or equivalent, and sections), one manager with 
overall responsibility for the unit, both administratively 
and professionally should be appointed.52
METHODS
Study design and setting
This article represents one substudy that is part of a 
broader qualitative, multilevel design single embedded 
case study, investigating regulatory quality improvement 
implementation and work across three levels of the 
specialised Norwegian healthcare system.37 53 The case 
was defined as the design, implementation and enact-
ment of the Quality Improvement Regulation and its 
impact on management and quality improvement across 
three organisational levels in two health regions. Specif-
ically, the multilevel study involves three levels of stake-
holders: macrolevel (governmental bodies of regulation), 
mesolevel (County Governors’ inspectors- regional super-
vision) and microlevel (three hospitals selected from two 
regional health trusts in Norway). To illustrate, figure 1 
outlines the three system levels involved in the overall case 
study, whereas the microlevel presented in this article is 
specifically marked.
According to a multilevel approach, different levels of 
stakeholders have different impact on the risk manage-
ment process.54 These levels are interconnected through 
processes of information and decision- making, thus 
asking questions within three levels rather than within 
one single level, might help overcome single- level limita-
tions.55 Moreover, a multilevel study design can contribute 
to reflect healthcare organisations as integrated wholes 
where the patterns among different stakeholders are a 
key area of investigation.56 Accordingly, this article pres-
ents the microlevel substudy, based on semistructured inter-
views with 20 Norwegian hospital managers and quality 
advisers. Macrolevel findings and mesolevel findings are 
presented in two separate research articles.37 53
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Participants
The inclusion criteria were participants who currently worked 
as hospital managers or advisers to hospital managers, pref-
erably with clinical experience, situated at all levels within 
the hospital organisations, for example, head of clinic, head 
of department, divisional manager. Out of 20 participants, 
18 had authorisation and license as health personnel and 
clinical experience from hospital practice. Several of them 
still worked clinically. Four out of five advisers had previous 
hospital manager experience and were chosen to highlight 
the support system for managers in the selected hospitals. 
Gender balance: 11 men and 9 women. See table 3 for partic-
ipants’ characteristics.
Recruitment
Participants were recruited from three different hospitals. 
Hospital one and two belonged to the same regional health 
trust, while hospital three belonged to a different regional 
health trust. These three hospitals were selected as they were 
affiliated with the three County Governors offices recruited 
at the mesolevel in the broader multilevel study. Relevant 
Table 2 Details on the Quality Improvement Regulation’s regulatory Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA) design48 49
PDSA step Key areas and improvement tasks Examples of specific activities
The duty to plan  ► Plan tasks and activities
 ► Gain overview of responsibility, laws, 
regulations, guidelines and of deviations.
 ► Gain overview of adverse events, risks 
and areas of significant need for quality 
improvement
 ► Plan how to minimise these risks.
Example 1: identify and discuss deviances reported to the 
hospital’s system for adverse event reporting.
Example 2: structured identification and analysis of the 
last 50 mortalities at the relevant hospital, through medical 
records.
The duty to 
implement (do)
 ► Ensure that activities relevant regulations 
and guidelines are known
 ► Develop and implement procedures and 
routines to reveal, correct and prevent 
breach and violation of sound professional 
practice and systematic quality improvement
Example 1: conduct a weekly, 15 min interdisciplinary 
meeting to visually display ideas for improving the quality 
in areas where patient complaints exist.
Example 2: relevant department or unit leader conducts a 
patient safety ‘visit’ with the objective of identifying risks 
and possible areas for improvement and to encourage 
collaboration between the management level and ‘front- 
line’ clinicians.
The duty to 
evaluate (study)
 ► Assess implementation of activities, plans, 
including systematic quality improvement 
efforts
 ► Evaluate if regulations are met
 ► Review deviations, adverse events to 
prevent similar events
 ► Minimum one annual systematic review of 
the management system
Example 1: corroborate the implemented efforts by using 
dashboard indicators.
Example 2: aggregate data from patient complaints about 
waiting time, to reduce waiting time.
The duty to 
correct (act)
 ► Correct unsound practice and regulatory 
violations
 ► Ensure implementation of systematic quality 
improvement efforts
 ► Improve necessary procedures, instructions, 
routines to reveal, correct violations
Example 1: apply small- scale testing to ensure that recent 
technology and new treatment is efficient.
Example 2: conduct a Pareto diagram/chart to uncover 
what causes certain registered issues at the relevant 
hospital unit.
Box 1 Key numbers in the Norwegian specialist 
healthcare system
Key numbers
 ► 1 987 263 million million patients treated and/or hospitalised in 
2019.106.
 ► 114 028 thousand people employed in the specialist healthcare ser-
vices in 2018.107.
 ► The overall level of staffing by higher level health personnel is rela-
tively high, with more than 50% of hospital employees being either 
physicians or nurses/midwives.107.
 ► €2667 (Kr27 100 Norway) in operating expenses per inhabitant in 
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participants were contacted by email; proposed participation 
in the study, of which all (except one) accepted the invitation 
to participate.
Data collection
All interviews were conducted during the spring of 2019, 
then transcribed. SFO conducted and audio recorded all 
interviews face to face, at the participants’ workplace. Each 
interview had a duration of approximately 1 hour to 1 hour 
and 30 min. Based on the preplanned semistructured inter-
view guide (see online supplemental file 1), open- ended 
questions focused on areas of responsibility, work practices, 
training, implementation of quality improvement measures, 
regulatory flexibility, the role of supervision in improvement 
work and learning, experiences connected to structural 
development and attitudes, cooperation among different 
levels of government, management levels in hospitals and 
clinical, front- line personnel.
More specifically, questions were asked to determine if and 
how the Quality Improvement Regulation addressed some 
of the issues and challenges described in previous external 
inspections. The questions included for instance whether 
non- detailed risk management goals in the new regulatory 
framework facilitated flexibility in practical application and 
how managers experienced the systematic PDSA method-
ology (see preplanned questions in the online supplemental 
file 1). In addition, questions relating to communication 
and interaction among different system levels were asked 
to give insight into the regulator–regulatee interaction. The 
latter was particularly important to ascertain how hospital 
managers viewed the role of regulators and the new regula-
tion, and the extent to which possible conflicts were reduced 
between government- level expectations and local- level, prac-
tices of managing quality improvement and safety.
Prior to the interviews, the participants received an informa-
tion sheet informing them about the study’s topic, methods 
and data protection, and the researcher’s (SFO) credentials 
and occupation at the time of the study. Participants were 
subsequently requested to give their written consent. No pre- 
existing relationship with any of the participants existed.
Analysis
Researcher SFO analysed the interview transcripts manu-
ally, using content analysis influenced by Graneheim and 
Lundman.57 This analytical process consisted of several steps. 
SFO initially read through all interviews and took notes of 
immediate thoughts that occurred after reading, before 
organising all interview transcripts into a matrix. Thereafter, 
SFO identified and condensed all meaning units, suggested 
codes and subcategories. Four themes emerged across the 
data. Researchers GBS and SW read all interview transcripts 
and participated in discussions about categories and themes, 
to ensure the data’s reliability.58 Our data were relatively rich, 
and we reached saturation during the analysis, justifying the 
number of participants.59 60
Resilience in healthcare constitutes a valuable framework 
that helps to understand how systems can function and 
improve despite disruptions and adverse events.61 A core idea 
Table 3 Participants’ characteristics
Participant Educational background* Position
Organisation 
and region
1 M.D., specialist, PhD Divisional manager A-1
2 R.N., MSc in risk management Adviser, quality and patient safety A-1
3 Lawyer Legal adviser, quality and patient safety A-1
4 M.D. Head of clinic A-1
5 R.N., MSc in risk management Adviser, quality; clinical coordinator B-1
6 R.N., specialist Head of quality B-1
7 Lawyer Deputy head of clinic B-1
8 M.D., PhD Medical director B-1
9 M.D., PhD Head of research C-2
10 D.D.S., PhD Head of clinic A-1
11 M.D., specialist, MSc in health management Head of clinic A-1
12 M.D., specialist; surgeon, PhD, management courses Head of department B-1
13 M.D., PhD, management courses Head of department B-1
14 R.N., specialist Head of department B-1
15 M.D., specialist; surgeon Head of clinic C-2
16 P.T., MSc in management Adviser, quality C-2
17 R.N., specialist Head nurse B-1
18 M.D. Senior adviser, quality and patient safety C-2
19 M.D., PhD Head of department C-2
20 R.N., MSc in health management Head of quality C-2
*M.D., medical doctor, R.N., registered nurse, D.D.S, doctor of dental surgery, P.T, physiotherapist.
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is that resilience is the ability of the healthcare system to adjust its 
functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, 
so that it can sustain required performance under both expected and 
unexpected conditions.62 63 Findings were therefore explained 
and interpreted by using resilience theory linked to adap-
tive capacity.63–67 The data were partly analysed inductively 
by identifying concepts within resilience in healthcare and 
partly deductively by using predetermined questions explic-
itly exploring resilience potentials.68
RESULTS
From our data of 20 interviews, we identified 4 themes: (1) 
adaptive capacity in hospital management and practice, (2) 
implementation efforts and challenges with quality improve-
ment, (3) systemic changes, and (4) the potential to learn. All 
four themes are discussed below, along with illustrative partic-
ipants’ quotes (numbers in parentheses indicate the link to 
participants characteristics, cf. table 3).
Theme I adaptive capacity in hospital management and 
practice
Participants agreed that the Quality Improvement Regula-
tion was designed in a way that supported flexibility, enabling 
managers to determine and adapt implementation efforts 
and quality improvement measures to their local context. 
This was portrayed as essential, partly due to the complexity 
in the system including different risks and elements (eg, post-
operative complications, team coordination, complex proce-
dures) of variation and uncertainty. Risk- based management 
was thus characterised as one of the favourable advantages 
with the new Quality Improvement Regulation, as it encour-
ages managers to assess risks according to specifics and hall-
marks in the relevant unit, department and clinic.
The Quality Improvement Regulation gives you room 
to maneuver because it has a generic design.
- Medical doctor, head of department (13)
After all, you are completely dependent on close dia-
logue with those who work (at the sharp end) and we 
as managers need to move closer to find out where we 
need to adjust and to discover the areas where things 
are not working.
- Medical doctor, head of clinic (11)
Participants argued that having a one size fits all solution 
is not easy, as improvising will always be necessary at a local 
level. They continued with describing that in a hospital you 
are not in control of your day because new situations occur, 
implying that it is impossible to anticipate every possible 
event. This is one of the main reasons for why implementa-
tion of new routines and procedures are challenging, partici-
pants claimed. They believed that the embedded risks would 
remain risks regardless of new regulatory requirements, 
illustrated by the fact that adverse events still occur despite 
new, improved routines and procedures. Adding to this, 
participants described how they worked on standardising 
procedures aiming to reduce some of the unwanted varia-
tion in their work but noted that methods of treatment and 
evidence evolve so quickly that procedures need constant 
updates. While the government sometimes presents a black 
and white solution, a procedure is only valid until good 
reasons exist to deviate from it, they noted.
There are so many different things that come up and 
occur, that it is not always easy to have a one size fits 
all solution. There is some improvisation sometimes, 
in how to approach a problem.
- Medical doctor, head of department (12)
For a very detailed procedure to work well, you must 
be able to predict all types of situations that the dif-
ferent medical practitioners may come across, and we 
do not always manage to predict that.
- Medical doctor, adviser in quality and patient safety (18)
Autonomy was described as a key flexibility feature in 
everyday hospital work, especially for physicians. However, 
high degrees of autonomy may sometimes compromise physi-
cians’ willingness to actively participate in systematic quality 
improvement work compared with the nursing profession, 
participants claimed.
They must get the impression of being involved in- 
and to influence their daily work. To give a purely ad-
ministrative order, like: “Now you must pull yourself 
together, you should do this and that”, that approach 
will not do, they will boycott it.
- Medical doctor, head of clinic (15)
They also reported that the flexibility leaves the hospi-
tals with the choice to implement whatever adverse event 
reporting system they choose. Furthermore, adaptive 
capacity to handle risks and challenges implies that hospi-
tals are influenced by their own competences in terms of 
having the right personnel and training. Some participants 
even requested more strict support and correctives from 
their senior managers because that would indicate that their 
manager knew what sort of challenges they struggled with 
in their everyday work (eg, quality improvement efforts are 
added on top of their everyday workload, lack of good quality 
indicators, lack of personnel and time, information overload, 
lack of coordinated data systems).
I feel that we are free to express it (further up the 
hierarchy) if we experience that some efforts do not 
make sense to our work practices.
- Nurse, head of department (14)
Physicians hate to be controlled. At the same time, 
they write to the Ministry “we got to have some clear 
guidelines”, so physicians both love and hate rules. 
And it’s a schizophrenia that physicians have always 
had.
- Medical doctor, adviser in quality and patient safety (18)
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Theme II implementation efforts and challenges with quality 
improvement
Our participants all agreed about the advantage and necessity 
of highlighting management responsibility in the new Quality 
Improvement Regulation. However, participants reported 
that most managers already have too many obligations and 
do not have time to prioritise systematic quality improvement 
efforts. Some even reported that many managers simply do 
not care about professional management and administering 
of their unit, department or clinic.
I think that the Quality Improvement Regulation is 
providing managers with an overall description of 
how a manager should act. You must do all these 
things that many people believe are obvious. And the 
Quality Improvement is kind of “stating the obvious”.
- Medical doctor, adviser in quality and patient safety (18)
Although PDSA as a method was familiar to the hospi-
tals prior to introducing the Quality Improvement Regu-
lation, several participants argued that the systematic four 
phase process is not embedded in health personnel’s 
work practice. They described all four phases as equally 
important but stressed that evaluation and restoring/
returning to a normal state are the most demanding to 
operationalise into reality.
The extent to which these (PDSA) circles work accord-
ing to the intention: there are measures implemented, 
and then there is no follow- up of the decisions. There is 
a total lack of it, I would almost say.
- Medical doctor, head of research (9)
I do not know if I am able to articulate how I work spe-
cifically with the four (PDSA) elements (…) because it is 
quite different from one area to the next.
- Nurse, head of quality (6)
Participants believed that the Quality Improvement Regu-
lation did not lead to change in their practice.
Some things have been done by the executive level, but 
the clinic managers have not addressed it.
- Nurse, quality coordinator (5)
Not directly linked (the introduction of the Quality 
Improvement Regulation and implementation of prac-
tical measures into clinical work). I cannot think of (ep-
isodes) where it was like “let us take a look at this (the 
Quality Improvement Regulation) and then start chang-
ing things”.
- Nurse, Head of Quality (20)
Lack of understanding of what was referred to as 
‘internal jargon’ in quality improvement and patient safety 
was believed to add to the burden and responsibilities of 
managers. However, several quality improvement measures 
were described, such as double check of medications, focus 
on communication in teamwork, reducing the number of 
hallway patients, questionnaire for patients’ satisfaction, 
preoperative marking, and surgical checklists. The latter was 
described as the most difficult, yet most successful implemen-
tation measure.
Several participants referred to what they experienced 
to be a common, yet a false claim: that physicians are not 
concerned about or involved in quality improvement. A lot of 
the improvement methodology is present although it is not 
stated clearly or written down and most physicians do work 
unconsciously in accordance with the quality improvement 
methodology, participants reported.
Theme III systemic changes
Findings revealed both structural and cultural changes to, 
and development of, quality improvement systems in the 
hospitals. The structural quality improvement elements were 
described in terms of the establishment of different types of 
meetings, councils and committees (eg, patient safety and 
quality councils, network meetings, internal audit meetings) 
at the administrative and management levels in hospitals.
We have built a new structure of quality and patient 
safety units.
- Lawyer, legal adviser in quality and patient safety (3)
Furthermore, systems of adverse event reporting and 
systems for documentation of procedures, routines, 
guidelines were introduced, and constantly evaluated 
and improved. The latter was described as extremely 
challenging in everyday work, as the number of available 
documents felt overwhelming, and sometimes routines 
and procedures overlapped or were outdated.
It has been one of the most important things, the sys-
tem for documentation, and we have been working 
intensely to clear away old routines, revise all routines 
and get them updated, especially since our new qual-
ity adviser started.
- Lawyer, deputy head of clinic (7)
In addition to hospital internal structural changes, 
participants described an increased governmental spot-
light on patient safety in general and on managers’ roles 
in reducing risks and enabling their employees to work 
safely and provide high quality care to patients. As a legal 
document, the Quality Improvement Regulation mani-
fested this development, the participants explained.
We were probably more mature now in order to get 
that new Quality Improvement Regulation, and what 
I think is very nice is that it is to the point, three pages 
and it is kind of “this is how we should do it”.
- Nurse, Head of Quality (20)
We are obliged to do an annual risk review, which 
we have never done before, and we believe that the 
(Quality Improvement) Regulation has helped us in 
turning the spotlight on that.
- Medical Director (8)
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All participants reported a cultural shift in improve-
ment work over recent years. They described a change 
in attitudes towards the importance of continuous quality 
improvement and the systematic approach to it. Courses 
and training that used to be ignored by physicians, had 
gained attention, and increased its popularity, however 
support systems and routines varied among the study 
sites. Several participants also had experienced and 
expected a further shift with new generations of physi-
cians approaching the field. This was explained partly 
due to the renewed curriculum introducing the method-
ology of systematic planning, acting, restoring and evalu-
ation early on in their education.
(Quality improvement work) is not entirely new, but 
quite new. When I started as a surgeon, these were 
things that never came into view, so it’s been a re-
markable change, especially over the last ten years.
- Medical doctor, head of clinic (15)
Today, managers can hardly speak without having to 
mention the word patient safety. So, it’s been an in-
teresting development.
- Medical doctor, adviser in quality and patient safety (18)
Theme IV the potential to learn
To maintain high quality care, interpersonal trust among 
health personnel and institutional trust between hospital 
managers and governmental supervisory bodies is a necessity, 
participants argued. Explaining why adverse event reporting 
was still weak, participants highlighted a safe work envi-
ronment. Participants felt that a healthy reporting regime 
emerges from a just culture, which in turn leads health 
personnel to feel confident that they will be taken care of if 
they make mistakes and if they report adverse events. Some 
noted that a systems- perspective to adverse events, supported 
by the Quality Improvement Regulation, was more frequently 
applied now compared with in previous supervision activities, 
contributing to the needed sense of confidence to openly 
discuss adverse events and risks.
And I think that in doing quality improvement and pa-
tient safety work, we need to recognise that the number 
one priority is to ensure that health personnel are confi-
dent that they will be taken care of if they make mistakes, 
and that they find themselves in a system that reduces 
the number of adverse events to a minimum.
- Medical doctor, head of department (19)
In general, organisational, and individual learning 
was described as challenging and even more so learning 
across departments, clinics and between hospitals. Partic-
ipants explained that it was difficult to learn from adverse 
events during normal work operations due to time pres-
sures, nor did health personnel always have the motiva-
tion to do it.
We are part of an intellectual organisation, right, 
that is what drives us forward. After all, it is about our 
minds. To be able to change things you must get all 
these minds on board. Otherwise, everything stops.
- Medical doctor, head of clinic (15)
Since it is difficult to learn from adverse events, and the 
time is lacking—participants argued that it is difficult to 
learn from successful outcomes too. Implementation of 
the Quality Improvement Regulation did not change this.
We do have regular meetings within the clinic and 
across departments, so we learn a lot and it is our re-
sponsibility to somehow pass it on to our department. 
I don’t think there is a good system for that, but I 
don’t know how it could be resolved. The challenge 
is the amounts of information which I must commu-
nicate further down the system, to my employees, 
but they work shifts and are not necessarily checking 
their email every day.
- Head nurse (17)
As a response to questions about the interplay between 
hospitals and supervisory bodies, most participants 
emphasised that supervision could be useful and help 
the managers to focus on certain risk areas or chal-
lenging work practices. However, participants gave exam-
ples of less helpful episodes, such as inspectors having 
different views on certain rules and regulations, adding 
that some recommendations from inspectors were diffi-
cult or impossible to implement in practice. Some noted 
that supervision focuses primarily on negative aspects of 
improvement and felt that internal audits were more rele-
vant and useful than governmental supervision, because 
the hospitals are leading their own problem solving.
If you have a written procedure and something hap-
pens, then they (red. inspectors) ask: “But why did 
you not do that?” Because the anatomy indicated dif-
ferently (red. physician answers). “But it states in your 
written procedure that you should do it, right?” That 
is how a lawyer speaks compared to a physician…
- Medical doctor, head of clinic (15)
DISCUSSION
The main findings
According to the Quality Improvement Regulation, 
managers are responsible for implementation efforts and 
for the use of PDSA methodology. Our participants never-
theless described no change in their practice (related to 
quality and safety activities) solely due to this new regula-
tory framework. The introduction of the Quality Improve-
ment Regulation was thus perceived by the participants as 
having no direct link with how they performed their work. 
Despite that, this study discovered structural and cultural 
changes to, and development of, quality improvement 
systems in hospitals in recent years. We argue that the 
structural and cultural changes that have happened (eg, 
annual quality and patient safety reports to the Norwegian 
Parliament, National Strategy for Quality Improvement in 
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Health and Social Services (2005–2015),39 ‘Patient Safety 
Program’40), also included the revision of the previous 
Internal Control Regulations into a new regulatory frame-
work.13 48 Hence, the governmental development of the 
Quality Improvement Regulation appears to be part of 
that systemic change. Participants described several bene-
fits with the Quality Improvement Regulation in terms 
of adaptation and flexibility to local context, and clinical 
autonomy as an inevitable element in hospital practice. 
Trust and a safe work environment were considered key 
factors to support adverse event reporting and learning 
processes in general. The latter was crucial if collabora-
tion with external supervisory inspectors should positively 
influence hospital quality enhancement.
Strengths and limitations of this study
It is assumed essential to involve different types of stake-
holders when researching the system- level phenomenon 
of risk- based management, where complexity, uncer-
tainty and variation are key concepts.53 69 This study 
investigated hospital managers’ perspectives and experi-
ences with practical implications of a specific regulatory 
change. Lower level management implementation of the 
new regulatory requirements was given main attention 
in our study. It is thus a limitation that it only reports 
the perspectives of managers and no other stakeholders 
from different levels in the system, such as patients, full- 
time clinicians, regulators. The perspectives of regulators 
and inspectors are presented in two separate research 
articles.37 53 The main study strength is the uncommon 
approach of involving hospital managers in healthcare 
regulation research, as they both legally and practically 
are responsible for improving quality and safety. An addi-
tional strength is that most participants had substantial 
clinical experience and/or stilled worked in the clinic 
environment, in addition to having management respon-
sibilities, which provided the study with valuable insight 
into the complexity in hospital management. A limitation 
with this study is that the interviews focused on hospital 
managers own reflections and did not include any obser-
vational study of practice/implementation/change. 
Another limitation is that two out of four regional health 
trusts in the Norwegian specialist healthcare system were 
not included. This may have hampered valuable informa-
tion about the implementation process and geograph-
ical variations since the support systems and routines 
for training managers differ from region to region. 
Guided by the information power, however, the sample 
size of 20 participants was adequate and supported our 
effort to ensure trustworthiness.57 70 We did neverthe-
less not discuss potential differences among participants 
belonging to the three different local health trusts (which 
could be viewed as a limitation), as we did not fully map 
resources, size and context of their quality advising units. 
However, all hospitals had established committees, boards 
and units related to quality improvement, and the struc-
tural and cultural changes reported in theme 3 reflected 
that overall systemic development.
Implementation, the capacity to adapt and the link to support 
systems
Healthcare regulation is tailored in various ways by the 
government, depending on the area. Some sectors are 
strictly governed by prescriptive rules (eg, medication- related 
issues).64 The idea with the Quality Improvement Regula-
tion’s design on the other hand was to provide managers with 
non- detailed goals for risk management- based implementa-
tion. With a non- detailed regulatory framework, the govern-
ment does not specify how hospital managers should ‘get 
there’, built on ideas of local autonomy and context sensi-
tivity.64 As our data revealed, improvisation and local adap-
tation is viewed as essential to hospital management, along 
with an acceptance that healthcare situations such as patient 
treatment, diagnosis or surgery can develop into unforeseen 
scenarios which cannot be planned for. Regulatory measures 
that are too standardised or prescriptive could adversely 
reduce the autonomy of managers and health personnel. 
Our findings illustrated that managers acknowledged that 
strict regulations could potentially affect and hamper patient 
safety in cases where flexibility could be beneficial to the 
outcome.
However, a high degree of system adaptive capacity could 
occasionally represent a disadvantage, for instance when a 
procedure is adjusted but leads to an unsuccessful or unac-
ceptable outcome,67 or regulatory flexibility combined with 
a lack of interest in quality improvement work allows regu-
latees to deliberately ignore quality and safety expectations. 
Moreover, when choices and decisions are left to hospital 
organisations it creates considerable demand for internal 
systems to train managers, to establish systems for imple-
mentation support and IT solutions. This is echoed by past 
research on the growth of internal bureaucracy due to 
governmental deregulation of safety management.71 Hence, 
our study found a paradox in the systemic development of 
meetings, councils and committees at the administrative and 
management levels in hospitals to comply with regulatory 
requirements for quality and safety, while managers reported 
few changes at the sharp end; in clinic, related to implemen-
tation of quality and safety activities. It is reasonable to think 
that there is a disparity in hospital manager support across 
different hospitals. Thus, having autonomous responsibility 
for competences and management training could in turn 
lead to different priorities in different regions and hospitals. 
Variation in support systems and routines was nevertheless 
reflected in our results.
Moreover, previous research has emphasised skills and 
support to manage conditions of unexpected events, and 
that managers (due to prioritisation struggles) need guid-
ance to understand what is operationally needed.72–74 
Indeed, lack of knowledge and skills is perceived a signif-
icant barrier to quality improvement.75 76 We argue that 
our current study demonstrates that the Quality Improve-
ment Regulation’s non- detailed regulatory design, leaving 
implementation decisions to managers, could complicate 
managers’ understanding of governmental expectations. 
This resonates especially since the requirements need to 
be translated before practically applied (eg, how to define 
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specific hospital- conduct as reasonable; safe; prudent or what 
is adequate documentation). As successful implementation 
requires more than a change in regulatory rhetoric or design, 
our study indicates that support tools for managers to achieve 
the goals in a systematic way have not been fully developed yet. 
The disjunction between rhetoric and reality, or theory versus 
practice, is a familiar one in research on implementation of 
rules and regulations in healthcare. It is often referred to as a 
dichotomy of work as imagined versus work as done.66 77 This 
applies particularly to how requirements are trickled down 
the system to get resonance with those who do the actual 
implementation.31 34 35 78 79 When lower level managers fail to 
implement efforts because they are difficult to convert into 
practice or that the policies being implemented have a weak 
relationship with the core clinical tasks, a process of ‘decou-
pling’ has occurred.34 35 The study of van de Bovenkamp et 
al80 revealed that hospitals needed to do a lot of interpretive 
work to make use of regulation; however, autonomy enabled 
this strategic work. Other studies have shown that additional 
resources and systems sometimes are needed to interpret and 
implement regulatory requirements.81 As detailed rules and 
regulations may often be perceived as barriers to implemen-
tation, focusing regulatory attention on defining the quality 
of processes and outcomes could potentially make regulatory 
expectations more feasible for practical implementation. 
On the other hand, some hospital managers may find less 
details less helpful, because most of the responsibility, deci-
sions and operationalisation are left with them. What can 
be drawn from this is that it will be important to consider 
how regulatory expectations are designed in ways that enable 
hospital managers to put efforts into practical reality. This 
implementation gap may also partly be explained by the 
type of managers who oversee implementation efforts. With 
different leadership approaches debated in the literature, 
prior research has identified how clinical managers’ some-
times struggle with role and identity.12 82–86 Thus, to become 
interested in management, there ought to be awareness of 
meaning and purpose in management training, as it is first 
and foremost clinical work that is perceived meaningful 
to them.12 86 Moving forward, it will be crucial to develop 
management practices that encourage quality improve-
ment efforts, and encourage health personnel to partici-
pate.15 87 Putting clinicians in management roles, provided 
with adequate leadership and quality improvement training, 
is key to making improvement an embedded and inclusive 
activity in everyday clinical work—especially since clinical 
managers often have experienced the importance of flexible 
and adaptive behaviour firsthand.11 12 32 Thus, the ‘hybrid 
professional manager’ might bridge professional manage-
ment, clinical identity and engagement, constituting an 
important system factor underpinning successful quality 
improvement and implementation.84 85 88
PDSA—government favoured methodology for quality 
improvement
Although the Quality Improvement Regulation mani-
fested the PDSA logic,38 it did not independently explain 
if and why managers decided to put quality and safety 
activities on their agenda. Our findings indicated that 
clinicians worked with quality improvement, but they 
did not necessarily follow the PDSA- logic nor were they 
familiar with the Quality Improvement Regulation. 
Moreover, several participants described that measuring 
improvement efforts was challenging. This study links 
this to the assumption that everything is measurable 
according to the PDSA logic.89 In that sense, and alike 
our study, prior research has found some drawbacks in 
using PDSA in hospitals’ quality improvement work.90–92 
Although the PDSA methodology encourages learning 
and supports adaptation of interventions, its efficient use 
requires considerable training and organisational and 
managerial support.91 If PDSA is to remain at the core of 
regulatory design, then issues of organisational support 
and training need to be accounted for by regional health 
trusts and Government budgets.
Several alternative quality improvement methodologies 
exist. For instance, Six Sigma (define, measure, analyse, 
improve, control), Lean (identify waste; activities that 
do not add value), root cause analysis (identify the under-
lying causes; reactive in its approach), failure modes and 
effect analysis (identify potential adverse events, failures 
and hazards; proactive in in its approach).93 Commonly 
among these approaches is that they presuppose identifi-
cation of a specific problem area or cause(es) before the 
next steps of action might be implemented. This could 
possibly make managers overlook certain areas that are 
not obviously apparent. Thus, based on the contextual 
reality of hospital managers, reflected in our findings 
about resources and lack of time, we argue that complex, 
non- linear processes are challenged by these methodol-
ogies. Moreover, systemic risk factors such as resources 
and time are embedded and often linked and interre-
lated when an adverse event occurs.94–97 Other organisa-
tional design considerations also seem important, beyond 
specific improvement methods. For instance, the inclu-
sion of short, daily breaks to facilitate learning episodes 
may assist in improvement efforts.98 Organisational adap-
tations such as this could address some of the challenges 
identified by participants in this study, where systematic 
quality improvement in line with the Quality Improve-
ment Regulation’s PDSA logic, was viewed as too time 
consuming to justify full- scale implementation.
Implications for clinicians and policy-makers—and future 
research
This study is of relevance to both regulatory bodies and 
the management levels within hospitals. It adds some 
useful insights to development and implementation of 
future regulatory amendments in a Norwegian and in 
an international context. Moreover, the study highlights 
the importance of ensuring that any macrolevel quality 
improvement initiatives and regulatory requirements 
are accompanied by appropriate resourcing, support, 
and advanced preparation to ensure that it has the 
best possible chance of being implemented effectively. 
Our results therefore may contribute to theoretical 
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development of macrolevel regulation, by implying how 
inclusive governance can add value to fill in the gap 
between work as imagined and work as done and support 
adaptive capacity as a positive element in quality improve-
ment work.67 Additionally, our study highlights regional 
variation in management training and programmes for 
leadership development, which fuels the idea that it will 
be important to provide a minimum level of training to all 
hospital managers, regardless of organisational level and 
regional affiliation. Yet, there are some unanswered ques-
tions that speaks for future research, for instance:
 ► How to provide additional management support 
for implementation through adding ‘practice 
facilitators’.72
 ► How to improve the collaboration between inspectors 
and hospital managers.99
 ► It would also be valuable to engage in cross- country 
comparative research to investigate how different 
regulatory regimes value flexibility in regulatory strat-
egies for quality improvement and patient safety.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we explored how hospital managers work to 
improve quality and investigated their experiences with 
implementing the new Quality Improvement Regulation, 
provided to support management of quality improve-
ment. The study showed that lack of time, competence 
and/or motivation, appears to limit the implementation 
of quality improvement efforts. While managers’ work 
to improve quality does not solely depend on a specific 
regulatory framework, the Quality Improvement Regula-
tion may be an instrument that over time, leads to struc-
tural and cultural change. In turn, it can push managers 
towards a shift in strategic learning focus and resource 
allocations. Ultimately, hospital managers’ autonomy 
and their adaptive capacity and ability to tailor quality 
improvement efforts to local circumstances were key for 
the new Quality Improvement Regulation to have any 
relevant impact on hospital practice and for it to influ-
ence quality and safety activities.
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